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INTERNATIONAL PECUNIARY CLAIMS
AGAINST MEXICO
The Claims Commission which will ultimately be established
to adjudicate upon claims of citizens of the United States 
and
other countries against Mexico will have to decide some of 
the
most interesting and practical questions of international 
law.
Not the least important of these are the fundamental questions 
of
the liability of the Carranza government for its own acts 
while
a revolutionary faction (the Constitutionalists) and for those 
of
the Huerta government it has displaced. An examination 
of
these questions in the light of international law and precedents
may not prove without interest.
Assuming that the Carranza government will maintain itself
as the regularly constituted government of Mexico and its respon-
sible representative before the Commission, the first factor 
of
consequence to be considered is that it has arisen out of a 
suc-
cessful revolution. While it is a general principle that a state
or nation is not responsible for the acts of unsuccessful revo-
lutionists beyond its control, the rule in the case of successful
revolutionists is quite different. The government created through
its efforts is liable for the acts of the revolutionists as well as
for those of the titular government it has displaced.' Its acts
are considered as at least those of a general de facto government
2
for which the state is liable from the beginning of the revolu-
'Bolivar Railway Company (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela (Feb. 17, 19o3)
Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of i9o3, p. 394.
2 Dix (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb. i7, 19o3) Ralston, 7; Heny (U. 
S.)
v. Venezuela, ibid., 14, 22.
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tion, on the theory that the revolution represented ab initio a
changing national will crystallizing in the final successful result.8
Thus, the government created through a successful revolution
becomes liable for all services rendered to the revolution. 4  The
unlawful acts of successful revolutionists render the government
equally liable. 5  Moreover, the successful revolutionists appear
to be bound from the beginning of the revolution by the stipula-
tions of national treaties, for the violation of which they will be
held liable as successors of the titular government.
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS AS AUTHORITIES BINDING THE NATION
As will be observed presently, a distinction is made between a
general de facto government exercising control over the whole
or practically the whole nation and a local de facto government
exercising control within a part of the nation only. The gov-
ernment of Huerta began its rule at least as a general de facto
government, if not the constituted government of Mexico,
although its control was gradually diminished by the increasing
strength and spread of the Constitutionalists. It has been con-
tended that Huerta's assumption of power in Mexico City was
in accordance with the constitutional forms prescribed by the
Mexican Constitution. If that is so, his acts from the beginning
to the end of his "dictatorship" bind the nation. On the other
hand, if he may not be considered to have represented the con-
stituted government, he did in the beginning, it is believed,
actually exercise control over practically the whole nation, and his
government, therefore, may be considered a general de facto
S Bolivar Railway Co. v. Venezuela, supra; Williams v. Bruffy (1878)
96 U. S. 176.
4 Oteri Claim v. Honduras, For. Rel. 1899, 352 (use of steamer);
Kummerow (Germany) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 19o3) Ralston, 561; Redler
(Germany) v. Venezuela, ibid., 560; Baasch and Rimer (Netherlands) v.
Venezuela (Feb. 28, i9o3) ibid., 907. But in one case such a successful
revolutionist government was considered by Secretary Blaine as not liable
for military services rendered to the legitimate government in suppression
of the very revolution which ultimately became successful. Mr. Blaine,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Patterson (Apr. 7, i8go) 6 Moore, Dig. 624.5 Hill (U. S.) v. Peru (Dec. 4, 1868) Moore, Arb. 1665; Hughes (U. S.)
v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore, Arb. 2972; Fowks v. Peru, For. Rel.
1901, 430-434; MacCord v. Peru (May 17, 1898) 6 Moore, Dig. 985-99.
(These were cases of personal injury and unlawful imprisonment.)
6 Fowks Claim v. Peru, supra.
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tion, on the theory that the revolution represented ab initio a
changing national will crystallizing in the final suc es ful result.s
Thus, the government created through a successful revolution
becomes liable for all services rendered to the revol ti ! The
unlawful acts of successful revolutionists render the govern ent
equally liable.5 Moreover, the successful revolutionists appear
to be bound from the beginning of the revolution by the stipula-
tions of national treaties, for the violation of which they will be
held liable as successors of the titular government.6
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS AS AUTHORITIES BINDING THE NATI
As will be observed presently, a distinction is ade bet een a
general de facto government exercising control over the hole
or practically the whole nation and a local de facto govern ent
exercising control within a part of the nation onl . The gov-
ernment of Huerta began its rule at least as a general de facto
government, if not the constituted govern ent of i ,
although its control was gradually di inished t i r i
strength and spread of the Constitutionalists. It as c
tended that Huerta's assumption of power in exico ity as
in accordance with the constitutional for s prescribed by t e
Mexican Constitution. If that is so, ·his acts fro the beginning
to the end of his "dictatorship" bind the nation. n the other
hand, if he may not be considered to have represented t e -
stituted government, he did in the beginning, it is believed,
actually exer.cise control over practically the hole ati , i
government, therefore, a i r l to
SBolivar Railway Co. v. Venezuela, supra; Williams v. Bruffy (1878)
96 U. S. 176.
4 Oteri Claim v. Honduras, For. ReI. IBgg, 352 (use of stea er);
Kummerow (Germany) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 1903) Ralston, 561; e ler
(Germany) v. Venezuela, ibid., 560; Baasch and Ro er ( etherlands) 'U.
Venezuela (Feb. 28, 1903) ibid., 907. But in one case such a successful
revolutionist government was considered by Secretary Blaine as not liable
for military services rendered to the legitimate government in suppression
of the very revolution which ultimately became successful. r. laine,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Patterson (Apr. 7, IBgo) 6 oore, Dig. 624.
5 Hill (U. S.) v. Peru (Dec. 4. 1868) Moore, Arb. 1665; Hughes ( . .)
v. Mezico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore, Arb. 2972; Fowks v. Peru, For. eI.
1901, 430-434; MacCord v. Peru (May 17, 18gB) 6 oore, ig. 985-990.
(These were cases of personal injury and unlawful i prisonment.)
6 Fowks Claim v. Peru, supra.
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government. In this event also his acts bind the state. If, how-
ever, the Huerta government is considered merely as having
exercised control from the beginning within only a portion of
Mexico-no definition has apparently been attempted as to how
great a portion of the territory must be controlled by a govern-
ment in order that it may be considered a general de facto
government-and contending for control against a legitimate
government, it may be that under the general rules governing
local de facto governments an attempt might be made by Mexico
to reject liability for the acts of the Huerta government.
As against governments that recognized Huerta's as the legiti-
mate government of Mexico, it is very probable that Carranza's
government will be compelled to assume liability for the acts of
the Huerta government. As against governments which declined
to recognize Huerta, such as the United States, Carranza may
attempt to reject any liability on the ground that as a local de
facto government, Huerta's government could not bind the Mexi-
can nation. This phase of the case will be examined presently.
It is believed, however, that Huerta's government was at all
times more than a local de facto government and was, in fact,
either the constituted government or at least a general de facto
government, in either of which events the Mexican nation
becomes liable for the acts of the Huerta government.
Inasmuch as the question will undoubtedly arise as to the legal
nature of the Huerta government and of the liability of Mexico
for its acts, the following considerations on the question of de
facto governments are submitted.
The internal political changes which a state may undergo do
not affect its international personality. In the rapid change of
government to which some states have been subject, certain
parties have secured control and exercised the powers of govern-
ment without compliance with constitutional or strictly regular
forms. This control may extend over the entire nation or over
certain parts only. It becomes important then to determine when
such control of the administration may be said to have become
a de facto government, and to what extent the acts of such a
provisional government are binding upon the 
nation.7
7 Rougier, A., Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (Paris, 1903) pp.
481 if; Wiesse, C., Le droit international appliqu aux guerres civiles
(Lausanne, i898) pp. 235 ff. If the de jure successor of such a de facto
government is the government it has itself displaced, it is then known as
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It is necessary, first, to distinguish between the powers of a de
facto government which has displaced the de jure government
within the whole or practically the whole nation, as, e. g., the
government of Cromwell, of Nhpoleon I, and of the Republic
of 1848 in France, and a de facto government which controls
only a limited portion of the hational territory, as the Confederate
government did in the United States. The former may be called
a "general" de facto government, which resembles closely a
lawful government, and the latter, a "local" de facto govern-
ment or faction. The legal consequences of this distinction are
important.8
A general government de facto, having completely taken the
place of the regularly constituted authorities in the state, binds
the nation. So far as its international obligations are concerned,
it represents the state. It succeeds to the debts of the regular
government it has displaced, and transmits its own obligations
to succeeding titular governments.9 Its loans and contracts bind
the state, and the state is responsible for the governmental acts
of the de facto authorities. In general, its treaties are valid
obligations of the state. It may alienate the national territory,
and the judgments of its courts are admitted to be effective after
its authority has ceased. An exception to these rules has occa-
sionally been noted in the practice of some of the states of Latin-
America, which declare null and void the acts of a usurping de
facto intermediary government when the regular government it
has displaced succeeds in restoring its control.19  Nevertheless,
the "intermediary" government. i Moore, Dig. 41 ff. Ralston, Interna-
tional Arbitral Law, secs. 430, 448-456; Gaudu, Raymond, Essai sur la
ligitimiti des gouvernements dans ses rapports avec les gouvernements de
fait (Paris, 1914).
8 Williams v. Bruffy (1878) 96 U. S. i76, 186.
9 The Neapolitan Indemnity (Oct. i4, x832) Moore, Arb. 4575-4589
(Two Sicilies admitted liability for acts of Murat's government). Treaty
of July 4, 1831, between U. S. and France admitted liability of France
for acts committed during the Empire. See Wiesse, op. cit., 246; Miller
(U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore, Arb. 2974; Republic of Peru v.
Dreyfus (1888) 38 Ch. Div. 348, and particularly decision of Franco-
Chilean Tribunal of Arbitration in Lausanne, in Claim of Dreyfus Bros.,
Descamps and Renault, Recueil int. 1901, 396-398.
10 Wiesse, op. cit., 244 ff. Limitations of space prevent any detailed
discussion of the various kinds of governmental acts which survive the
downfall of a usurping de facto government. This is largely a question
of constitutional law. Pradier-Fod&6, Vol. I, sec. 134.
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acts validly undertaken in the name of the state and having an
international character cannot lightly be repudiated and foreign
governments generally insist on their binding force."' The
legality or constitutional legitimacy of a de facto government
is without importance internationally in so far as the matter of
representing the state is concerned.1
2
The responsibility of the state for the acts of a local de facto
government involves more delicate questions. Such a local gov-
ernment de facto may be maintained by military force within a
portion of a larger territory, either as an enemy making war
against the invaded nation-a military occupant--or as "a revo-
lutionary organization resisting the authority of the legitimate
government or of other factions contending for national control.
The power of such a de facto government to involve the respon-
sibility of the state depends largely upon its ultimate success, so
that most of its international acts, e. g., treaties, etc., are affected
with a suspensive condition. Nevertheless, even if it fails, defi-
nite executed results follow from its merely temporary posses-
sibn of administrative control within a defined area. These may
be considered briefly.
A temporary occupant or local de facto government carries
on the functions of government, supported usually directly or
indirectly by military force.'
3  It may appoint all necessary
officers and designate their powers, may prescribe the revenues
to be paid and collect them, and may administer justice.'
4  For-
eigners must perforce submit to the power which thus exercises
jurisdiction, and a subsequent de fitre government cannot expose
them to penalties for acts which were lawful and enforced by
"2Thus, Peru, notwithstanding art. io of its Constitution and its law of
1886, declaring void the acts of the usurper Pierola, was held responsible
for contracts which he had made. Dreyfus (France) v. Chile (July 23,
1892, award July 5, igoi) Descamps and Renault, RecueU int. 19o, 396.
12 Bluntschli, secs. 44, 45, i2o; Holtzendorff, Vol. II, sec. 21; Pradier-
Fod& , secs. 134, i49; Rivier, Vol. II, pp. 113, 44o; Rougier, pp. 48!;
Dreyfus (France) v. Chile, Franco-Chilean Arbitration (Lausanne) p.
290, and authorities there cited; Gaudu, op. cit.
Is 1 Moore, Dig. 45 ff; 7 ibid., 257 ff; 20p. Atty. Gen. 321 ; 9 ibid., 140;
Magoon, Rep. ii if; Hall, Part 3, chap. iv; Oppenheim, p. 204 if;
Bordwell, P., Law of war (Chicago, i9o8) chaps. viii and ix; Spaight,
J. M., War rights on land (London, ip1) chaps. xi and xii.
14 The German legislation for the occupied territories of Belgium is
being collected and edited by C. 1. Huberich and A. Nicol-Speyer (The
Hague, Nijhoff, 915-- ).
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the de facto government when done. The temporary de facto
government may legislate on all matters of local concern, and
in so far as such legislation is not hostile to the subsequent de
jure government which displaces it, its laws will be upheld.'"
A military occupant as a general rule may not vary or suspend
laws affecting property and private personal relations or those
which regulate the moral interests of the community. If he does,
his acts in so doing cease to have legal effect when the occupation
ceases. Political and administrative laws are subject to suspen-
sion or modification in case of necessity.16
The collection of taxes and customs duties within the territory
and during the period of occupancy of the local de facto govern-
ment relieves merchants and tax-payers from a subsequent
second payment upon the same goods to the succeeding de jure
government.' Such a temporary government may levy contri-
butions on the inhabitants for the purposes of carrying on the
war, but they must not savor of confiscation. It may seize prop-
erty belonging to the state and may use it. It may receive money
due the state and give receipts in the name of the state.'8 This,
however, applies only to debts payable within the territory and
period of occupancy.
Debts due by the state cannot be confiscated or the interest
sequestered by a temporary occupant,' 9 and private property
must be respected. The occupant or local de facto government
cannot alienate any portion of the public domain.20  The fruits
thereof may be sold, but only that part accruing during the period
of occupancy.2 ' A local de facto government may become the
15 Bruffy v. Williams (1878) 96 U. S. 176, 185; U. S. v. Home Ins. Co.
(1874) 22 Wall. (U. S.) 99; Sprott v. U. S. (1874) 2o Wall. (U. S.)459, 464. But the de jure government which ousts a usurping de facto
government (e. g., The Confederates) may disregard all its acts which
contributed to its support, except that it cannot collect taxes and duties
a second time.
- Hall, pp. 475-476.
17 U. S. v. Rice (I819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 246; Mazatlan and Bluefields
cases, i Moore, Dig. 49 ff; Cases in U. S. Civil War and in Colombia,
6 ibid., 995-996; Message of the President, For. Rel. igoo, xxiv; Mac-
Leod v. U. S. (1913) 229 U. S. 416, 429.
18 Magoon, Rep. 261, citing Phillimore and Halleck.
197 Moore, Dig. 3o6 and authorities cited in note, p. 308.
20 Coffee v. Groover (1887) 123 U. S. i; Georgiana and Lizzie Thompson
(U. S.) v. Peru (1867) Moore, Arb. 1595, 4785; Munford v. Wardwell
(1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 423, 425.
21 Georgiana and Lizzie Thompson claim (U. S.) v. Peru, supra. Art.
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owner of movables, which it may sell and hypothecate. A suc-
ceeding government takes such mortgaged property as rightful
owner subject to the liens thus created in good faith
2 2  As a
general rule, however, a succeeding de fure government is not
liable for debts contracted by a displaced local de facto govern-
ment.23 A person dealing with a local de facto government
assumes the risk of his enterprise. The de facto government may
issue paper money, and private contracts stipulating for payment
in such money will be enforced in the courts of the succeeding
de jure government. 24  Under compulsion, a government has at
times admitted liability for the wrongful acts of previous local
de facto governments.
25
Having in a general way described the difference between a
general and a local de facto government and their power to trans-
mit responsibility, it is now necessary to examine the criteria of
a de facto government, and the legal results of one of them in
particular, namely, recognition by the claimant's own government.
The existence of a de facto government is a question of fact.
Tests in establishment of this fact are the possession of supreme
power in the district or country over which its jurisdiction
extends, 28 the acknowledgment of its authority by the people or
55 of the Hague Regulations provides that a military occupant shall be
regarded as the administrator and usufructuary of the public buildings
of the State. See Maccas, Salonique occup~e et administre par les
Grecs (1913) 20 REV. GAN. DE Daorr INT. PuB. p. 207.
22[Jo S. v. Prioleau (1865) 35 L. J. (Ch.) 7; U. S. v. McRae (1869)
L. R. 8 Eq. 69; Hallet v. The King of Spain (1828) i Dow and Cl. i69;
The King of the Two Sicilies v. Wilcox (185o) i Sine. N. S. 332. But
see Barrett (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S. (May 8, 1871) Hale, Rep. 153, Moore,
Arb. 2900, where it was held that Confederate cotton, seized by the U. S.,
was not subject to a lien created by contract between claimant and the
Confederate states
2 3 Dom Miguel loan of 1832 was not binding on Portugal. Rougier,
p. 523.
24 Thorington v. Smith (1868) 8 Wall. (U. S.) i-, 9 (Contract made on a
sale of property and not in aid of the rebellion) ; Hanauer V. Woodruff
(,872) i5 Wall. (U. S.) 439, 448. As to the general effect of the acts
of the Confederate government, see Baldy v. Hunter (1897) 17, U. S.
388, 400.
25 E. g., Lord J. Russell made his recognition of the Jaurez government
in Mexico conditional upon the admission of responsibility for the acts
of the Miramon and Zuloaga governments. Lord J. Russell to Sir C.
Wyke, March 30, 1861, 52 St. Pap. 237, Moore, Arb. 29o6.
26Mauran v. Insurance Co. (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) i; Nesbitt v.,
Lushington (1892) 4 Term. 763.
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the bulk of them by their rendering it habitual obedience "from
fear or favor,"27 and finally, the recognition of the government
as de facto by foreign governments. 2 While each of these tests
is persuasive, none of them alone is conclusive, except as recog-
nition or failure to recognize by the claimant's own state may
operate as an estoppel.
In municipal courts, recognition by the political department of
the government is essential to judicial notice of the de facto
character of a foreign provisional government.29 In one case
at least, it has been held that such act or failure to act by the
government was not binding on an international tribunal.30 The
burden of proving that a particular government is a govern-
ment de facto rendering the nation responsible falls upon the
claimant.31 It has been held in several cases that recognition,
while important as evidence, does not create a de facto govern-
ment,3 2 nor is such recognition conclusive of its existence in fact.
The failure of the United States, however, to recognize certain
foreign governments as de facto, has been held binding upon its
own citizens and to estop them from asserting rights based upon
the de facto character of the government in question. 33 It is,
2 7 Opinion of Wadsworth, Commissioner, in McKenny (U. S.) v. Mexico
(July 4, i868) Moore, Arb. 2882. But a local de facto government gen-
erally controls by force and not favor. See also U. S. v. Rice (819) 4
Wheat. (U. S.) 253 and citations from Austin and Halleck in the case
of Day and Garrison (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore, Arb.
3553-3554 and Henriquez (Netherlands) v. Venezuela (Feb. 28, 39o3)
Ralston, 899. See also Janson (sic in original) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868)
Moore, Arb. 2902, 2930 and dictum by Wadsworth in Cucullu (U. S.) v.
Mexico, ibid., 2877.
2 8 Thorington v. Smith (1868) 8 Wall. (U. S.) 1, 9.
29 City of Berne v. Bank of England (i8o4) 9 Ves. 347; The Manilla
(1812) i Edw. Adm. i; Rose v. Himely (18o8) 4 Cranch (U. S.) 241;
Gelston v. Hoyt (I818) 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 246, 324; U. S. v. Palmer (18x8)
3 Wheat. (U. S.) 644.
30Jarvis (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb. i7, i9o3) Ralston, i5o. See also
Day and Garrison (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore, Arb. 356o
(although it was considered an important element in arriving at the fact).
31 Day and Garrison (U. S.) v. Venezuela, supra.
32 Cucullu (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore, Arb. 2873, 2877;
McKenny (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid., 2883 (Recognition of Zuloaga govern-
ment in Mexico by U. S. Minister and other foreign ministers held not
to establish its de facto character as a fact) ; Jarvis (U. S.) v. Venezuela
(Feb. 17, i9o3) Ralston, 150.
33 Jarvis (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb. i7, 29o3) Ralston, i5o (The Paez
government in Venezuela); Janson (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868)
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of course, an established principle of international law that the
recognition of the belligerent character of a revolutionary move-
ment releases the legitimate government from liability to the
citizens of the recognizing power for the belligerent acts of the
revolutionists, assuming that they are ultimately defeated. While
international commissions have held almost uniformly that only
a general de facto government can involve the responsibility of
the state,3 4 it was held in one case,
3 5 which has been sharply
criticized 3 that the state was responsible for the wrongful acts
of a local de facto government.
EFFECT OF CARRANZA'S ALLEGED DECLARATION THAT THE CONSTI-
TUTIONALISTS WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE DEBTS
CONTRACTED BY HUERTA
Newspaper reports have stated that Carranza has declared that
his government would not recognize the debts and obligations
incurred by Huerta. It is not believed that such a declaration
affects in any way the international liability of Mexico, under
the principles set forth above, for the obligations incurred by
the Huerta government. It is an established principle of inter-
Moore, Arb. 2902 (The Maximilian government in Mexico); Schultz
(U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) ibid., 2973 (Recognition of Juarez gov-
ernment by the United States estopped claimant from establishing that the
Miramon government was the de facto government of Mexico).
34 Day and Garrison (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, i885) Moore, Arb.
3548, 3553 dictum; Henriquez (Netherlands) v. Venezuela (Feb. 28, i9o3)
Ralston, 899.
The acts of a local de facto government were held not to bind the State
in Georgiana and Lizzie Thompson (U. S.) v. Peru, supra, and in the
Dom Miguel loan.
Again, e. g., Mexico was held not responsible for the acts of the Max-
imilian government: Janson (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore,
Arb. 29o2; Stickle, ibid., 2935; Baxter, ibid., 2934. Nor for those of the
Zuloaga and Miramon governments: Cucullu, ibid., 2873; McKenney, ibid.,
2881 and cases cited, p. 285. Nor the U. S. for acts of the Confederate
states: Prats (Mexico) v. U. S., ibid., 2886.
3 Baldwin (U. S.) v. Mexico (April 11, 1839) Moore, Arb. 2859-2866,
where the wrongful acts of a "junta" established for six months in a
state of Mexico were held to render Mexico responsible. See also Cen-
tral and South American Telegraph Co. (U. S.) v. Chile (Aug. 7, 1892)
Moore, Arb. 2938, 2942, where local de facto government was held entitled
to take advantage of a concession permitting the "government" to suspend
a cable service.
36 Lapradelle and Politis, Recueil des arbitrages, Vol. I, pp. 466-467.
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national law that acts of municipal legislation cannot alter the
international obligations of the stateY3 If an act of municipal
legislation cannot alter the international obligations oi the state,
it would seem that the mere declaration of the chief of a revo-
lutionary faction, whether ultimately successful or not, could
hardly affect the international obligations of the state.
A question has also been raised as to whether an alleged
declaration attributed to the President of the United States to
the effect that "he will not recognize as legal or binding any-
thing done by Huerta since he became Dictator," i. e., subsequent
to Huerta's dissolution of the Mexican Congress and the arrest
of certain deputies, October io, 1913, has any effect upon the
international obligations of Mexico, or operates as an estoppel
upon citizens of the United States to whom Huerta incurred
obligations subsequent to October io, 1913. As against foreign
governments, it would seem that the alleged statement of the
President does not alter the obligations of the Mexican nation
under the general principles of international lav. As regards
citizens of the United States having claims against Mexico, it
does not seem that the Mexican government can avail itself of
any such declaration to escape obligations properly incurred and
due by the nation or its authorities under the recognized prin-
ciples of international law. In other words, the declaration is
without legal effect except in so far as the Department of State,
in the exercise of its discretion as the prosecutor of the claims
of American citizens, may determine not to espouse claims of
the character described. As such a position would be politically
unwise and legally and morally unjust, it is hardly likely that
it will be taken. Claimants, therefore, may with some degree
of certainty ascertain the legal validity of their claims by an
examination of the law of international claims as laid down by
numerous mixed claims commissions, the decision of municipal
courts, the rulings of Secretaries of State and Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, and the opinions of international lawyers.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
NEW YORK BAR.
37 Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Foster, July 15, 1875, 6 Moore, Dig.
310; see Sec'y Bayard's statement with reference to the Venezuelan law
of February 14, 1873, 6 Moore, Dig. 745; see also For. Rel. 1887, 99;
1888, 491; and 1893, 73f-732.
